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1 Introduction
Since 1976 the U.S. trade deﬁcit has been lasting for about four decades. Global imbalances
are mainly featured by the massive and long-lasting U.S. trade deﬁcit with its major trade
partners, such as Japan, China and Europe historically. Figure 1 depicts the evolving path
of U.S. net export (as share of GDP), together with the U.S. GDP share in the world.1 In
the ﬁrst half of 1980s, the deterioration of the U.S. trade deﬁcit was attributed to the trade
imbalance between the U.S. and Japan. In the period of 1996-2006, the trade imbalances
from China and Europe were dominant. After the 2007-2008 global ﬁnancial and economic
crisis, the U.S. trade deﬁcit shrank a lot. In 2013, it was 3% of U.S. GDP, which still is
not a small number.
Figure 1: U.S. Net Export as Share of GDP and U.S. GDP Share in the World
There is a strong positive correlation between U.S. trade deﬁcit and U.S. GDP share
in the world in the business cycle frequency. This is intuitive since one country's export
is positively correlated with the GDP of the rest of the world and its import is positively
correlated with its GDP ceteris paribus. Engel and Rogers (2006) and others studied this
kind of positive correlation. However, the most striking fact given by Figure 1 is that:
the U.S. trade deﬁcit is a long-run, rather than a short-run, phenomenon, and there is no
1The data of U.S. nominal net export and nominal GDP are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at
the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the data of world nominal GDP is from the World Bank database.
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tendency for it to converge to zero even though it has already existed for about 40 years
without any discontinuity. This indicates that global imbalances or the long-lasting U.S.
trade deﬁcit may be a long-run existence at the steady state of the global economy, rather
than a temporary phenomenon (with some persistence) as believed by many researchers
such as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005) and Feldstein (2008).
What happened around 1976? The Breton Woods system collapsed in 1973, and it was
replaced in 1976 by the Jamaica Agreement, under which the U.S. dollar was no longer
pegged to gold and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes were allowed for other currencies. The
demonetization of gold did not weaken the global roles of the U.S. dollar much. Along
with oil and other major international commodities being denominated in the U.S. dollar
and the change of global geopolitics, the roles of the U.S. dollar as a world currency have
become quite stable. Goldberg and Tille (2008) show that: the dollar is overwhelmingly
used for invoicing both export and import prices for the US economy and other economies.
The U.S. dollar also plays a prominent role in the portfolios of foreign exchange reserve
accounts. And the dollar is a leading transaction currency in the foreign exchange markets
(Goldberg, 2010). Since 1976 the U.S. dollar has been playing a central and dominant role
in the international trade and ﬁnance as both a store of value and a medium of exchange,
and no other currencies rival it. The U.S. dollar is the only currency that can be viewed as a
world currency in the global economy. The global roles of the U.S. dollar as a store of value
and a medium of exchange in global markets induce global demands for it, which generate
both the short-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar in the global economy, as illustrated
by Liu (2014a), and the long-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar as the world currency,
which is accompanied with global imbalances and will be further shown in this paper.
According to a report to the US Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury Department,
between 50 percent and 70 percent of the U.S. currency was held outside the U.S. in 2000.2
Since running a trade surplus is a major way to obtain U.S. dollar for other economies,
global demands for the U.S. dollar make global imbalances a structural phenomenon: U.S.
has run trade deﬁcits with almost all its major trade partners for decades as depicted in
2This report is downloadable from http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/report3084.aspx.
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Figure 2.3 As long as there is a nominal growth of dollar-denominated international trades
due to either global economic growth or the deepening of globalization, the rest of the
world excluding U.S. needs to run a trade surplus to obtain extra dollars needed if there
is a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint for these transactions.
Figure 2: U.S. Trade (Goods) Balances with Major Partners
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005) and Feldstein (2008) predicted that: a permanent trade
imbalances between U.S. and the rest of the world is unsustainable, and thus a substantial
depreciation of the dollar's real exchange rate will take place in the future. This viewpoint
neglected that the special roles of the U.S. dollar as the only world currency will create
more and more demands for it in a world with nominal economic and trade growth, and
this force can prevent the U.S. dollar from depreciation, even in the long run. Figure 34
depicts the evolving path of the U.S. dollar (USD) index in the past four decades. Along
with the four-decade trade deﬁcits of the U.S., we can not see an evident trend of the U.S.
dollar's nominal depreciation. In fact the USD index was about 90 on average in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2015, indicating a strong U.S. dollar. Considering the performance of the U.S.
inﬂation rate compared to the inﬂation rates of major economies in the world during the
past decades, we can not see a substantial depreciation of the dollar's real exchange rate.
3The relevant data is from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/. And the U.S. trade deﬁcit mainly comes from the deﬁcit in goods.
4The data is from the website of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Figure 3: U.S. Dollar Index
To summarize, the long-lasting U.S. trade deﬁcit, indicating global imbalances, is a
long-run and structural phenomenon, and the special roles of the U.S. dollar as the world
currency seem to be an important factor to explain this phenomenon. This paper proves
that permanent global imbalances can be sustainable due to a special role of the U.S.
dollar, by building a two-country cash-in-advance growth model with a dollar standard
in the international trade. The permanent U.S. trade deﬁcit is an increasing function of
the strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand to ﬁnance international transactions, the long-run
growth rate of global nominal GDP, the openness of the international trade, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and the relative size of the U.S. economy
to the rest of the world. The long-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar as the world currency
exists.
The internationalization of RMB has becomes a hot topic recently. Why does one
country care so much about its currency's role in global markets? One economic reason
is that: by becoming a world currency like the U.S. dollar, one currency can bring some
permanent welfare to its country. This paper shows that: structural global imbalances are
accompanied by an unequal international trade with the terms of trade being beneﬁcial to
the U.S., and the welfare analysis indicates: a weakened U.S. dollar in the international
trade, represented by a weaker strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand, will reduce the welfare
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of the U.S. households, but increase the welfare of the rest of the world; and the welfare
of the whole world will be improved according to the utilitarian standard.
To simplify the analysis, in this paper we focus on the U.S. dollar's dominant role in
the international trade, but ignore its role in global ﬁnancial markets as a global reserve
currency. So ﬁnancial autarky is assumed for our following benchmark model. We believe
that the role of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency is also very important to
explain the long-run global imbalances. Secondly, we focus on the long-run steady state
analysis of the global economy, but ignore the business-cycle movement of the U.S. and
world economy, which has partly captured in Figure 1 and 3. We leave these issues for
future studies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature;
Section 3 constructs the benchmark model; in Section 4 the relationship between structural
global imbalances and deep parameters of the global economy is discussed in detail, and
welfare analysis is provided as well; in Section 5 we conclude.
2 Literature review
Literature on global imbalances and massive and long-lasting U.S. trade deﬁcit is rich.
According to diﬀerent reasons provided to explain global imbalances, the literature falls
into the following categories.
Bernanke (2005), Backus et al. (2005) and many others believe in the global savings
glut story, and take the viewpoint that a lack of investment opportunities and high savings
in the rest of the world caused an excessive supply of funds to the U.S. and thus resulted
in global imbalances.
Caballero et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009) use the asymmetry of ﬁnancial deep-
ness and the integration of global ﬁnancial markets to explain the global savings glut.
They argue that the superior quality and depth of the U.S. ﬁnancial system and capital
market imperfections in the emerging markets have led global investors to supply funds
cheaply to the U.S.
Engel and Rogers (2006), McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and Hoﬀmann et al. (2011)
consider that real factors such as diﬀerentials in growth prospects or productivity, rather
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than ﬁnancial factors, are the key reasons leading to global imbalances.
Policies are important as well. Blanchard et al. (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2009)
attribute the long-lasting U.S. trade deﬁcit partially to the economic policies of U.S. and
other economies. It is thought that a loose monetary policy along with credit market
distortions in the U.S. and the misalignment of nominal exchange rates of other economies
will lead to excessively cheap import prices for the U.S. in the short run, which will cause
the U.S. trade imbalance.
Demographic factors in diﬀerent economies are also employed to account for global
imbalances, such as in Domeij and Floden (2006) and Ferrero (2010). Ferrero (2010)
investigates the contribution of productivity growth, demographics and ﬁscal policy in
explaining the evolution of the U.S. external imbalances against industrialized countries.
He points out that while productivity growth plays a dominant role, demographics explain
a non-negligible and nearly permanent component of the U.S. trade deﬁcit. Besides the
above explanations, the large public-sector budget deﬁcits of the U.S. and some other
reasons are sometimes mentioned as well to explain global imbalances.
To summarize, most of the literature views the U.S. trade deﬁcit and global imbalances
as a persistent transitory phenomenon at the business-cycle frequency, rather than a long-
run steady state existence. They, such as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005), Feldstein (2008)
and Hoﬀmann et al. (2011), do not think that a permanent trade imbalance between the
U.S. and the rest of the world is sustainable forever. Secondly, most of the literature
ignores the special roles of the U.S. dollar as the world currency and their contribution in
accounting for global imbalances. This paper proves that permanent global imbalances can
be sustainable due to a special role of the U.S. dollar as the world currency, by building
a two-country cash-in-advance growth model with a dollar standard in the international
trade. This paper also proves the long-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar as the world
currency, and renews the thoughts about money neutrality in an open-economy setting
with a world currency.
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3 The Model
There are two countries in the world: the U.S. (denoted by H) and the ROW (rest of the
world, denoted by F ). The world is populated with a continuum of agents of 1 + n mass,
where the population in the segment [0, n) belongs to the U.S. and the population in the
segment (n, 1 + n] belongs to the ROW. The U.S. dollar serves as the invoicing currency
in the international trade. Each country specializes in one semi-ﬁnal good (produced in
a number of intermediate goods with measure equal to population size): home good YH,t
produced by the U.S. and foreign good YF,t by the ROW. The ﬁnal good for each country
(Yt orY
∗
t ) is a composite of the home good and the foreign good, which can be used for
households' consumption and capital investment; and the composition CES technologies
are as follows:
Yt =
[
(1− ρH) 1ω · (Y HH,t)ω−1ω + (ρH) 1ω · (Y HF,t)ω−1ω ] ωω−1
Y ∗t =
[
(1− ρF ) 1ω · (Y FF,t)ω−1ω + (ρF ) 1ω · (Y FH,t)ω−1ω ] ωω−1
where ω represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, ρj
(j = H or F ) refers to the share of domestic aggregate demand allocated to foreign goods
and is thus a natural index of openness for country j, and Y ji,t(i = H or F , and j = H or
F ) is the demand of country j for the intermediate good produced by country i.
3.1 The U.S. economy
3.1.1 Households
The representative household seeks to maximize the life time utility of each family member:
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt ·
(
ln
(
Ct
n
)
− φL · (Lt/n)
1+η
1 + η
)
where E is the expectation operator, β is the utility discount factor, Lt is aggregate labor
supply, and Ct is aggregate real consumption.
The representative household can invest in the real U.S. capital Kt with a capital rental
rate rt. Due to the monopolistic power of the intermediate-good ﬁrm, nominal proﬁt Dt
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is generated and then distributed to households. The household receives a nominal lump-
sum transfer Tt from the monetary authority. Therefore, the budget constraint for the
representative household is:
PtCt + PtIt +M
H
t+1 5 rtPtKt +WtLt +Dt + Tt +MHt (1)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, It(= Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt) is the investment on the real
U.S. asset, δ is the depreciation rate of the real asset, MHt is the money (the U.S. dollar)
demand of the U.S. households, and Wt is the nominal wage rate.
Money is introduced by a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint as follows:
ξ · (PtCt + PtIt) ≤MHt (2)
where ξ > 0 describes the strength of the CIA constraint on private consumption and
investment. When ξ = 1, it is the usual CIA constraint. Although there should be a
CIA constraint for import as well, this import CIA constraint for the U.S. households
holds naturally as long as inequality (2) is satisﬁed, because the international trade adopts
the dollar standard and the U.S. dollar is both a national currency and a world currency.
However, as we will show, it is not the same for the ROW households, because they need to
hold enough U.S. dollars in advance to ﬁnance imports from the U.S. and also its internal
transactions denominated in the U.S. dollar.
The ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) of the utility maximization problem are given by

φL · Lηt · 1n1+η − λ1tWt = 0
1
Ct
− (λ1t + ξ · λ2t )Pt = 0(
λ1t + ξ · λ2t
)
Pt − β · Et
[
λ1t+1Pt+1 (1− δ + rt+1)
]
−ξ · β · Et
[
λ2t+1Pt+1 (1− δ)
]
= 0
λ1t − β · Et
(
λ1t+1 + λ
2
t+1
)
= 0
(3)
where λ1t and λ
2
t are respectively the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to inequality
(1) and (2). Given that there is a positive inﬂation rate and a positive proﬁt of investment
on the U.S. asset, it is easy to prove that both λ1t and λ
2
t are positive, so inequality (1)
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and (2) are both binding.
Because the U.S. dollar serves as the global currency and the ROW households need
to have enough U.S. dollar in advance to ﬁnance imports, there is a foreign demand of the
U.S. dollar, MFt , which is normally called oﬀshore dollar. Therefore, the total demand
of the U.S. dollar, Mt, consists of two components:
Mt = M
H
t +M
F
t
3.1.2 Semi-ﬁnal goods production and Price indices
In this paper we assume that the representative household produces the ﬁnal good by
himself. Equivalently, one can also assume there are perfectly competitive ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers with the same CES technologies given above and there is zero proﬁt for them. Since
there is dollar standard in international trade, the export goods from either the U.S. or the
ROW are priced in the U.S. dollar. Consequently, it is PCP (producer currency pricing) for
the U.S. and LCP (local currency pricing) for the ROW. Given the price levels of goods,
the cost minimization problem of the ﬁnal good producers yields the following demand
functions:
Y HH,t =
(
1− ρH) · [PH,t
Pt
]−ω
Yt (4)
Y HF,t = ρ
H ·
[
PEF,t
Pt
]−ω
Yt (5)
where PH,t is the price level of home good, and P
E
F,t is the price level (denominated in the
U.S. dollar) of imported foreign good.
Similarly, semi-ﬁnal goods markets of each country are also perfectly competitive. Semi-
ﬁnal goods are produced by combining a continuum of domestic intermediate goods, YH,t(i)
or YF,t(i). The relevant technologies are also CES as follows:
YH,t =
[(
1
n
) 1
ε
ˆ n
0
YH,t(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
YF,t =
[ˆ 1
0
YF,t(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
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where i represents the brand of intermediate goods, and ε denotes the elasticity of substi-
tution between the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods within one single country. Then the
following demand functions can be obtained:
Y HH,t(i) =
1
n
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ε
· Y HH,t
Y FH,t(i) =
1
n
(
PEH,t(i)
PEH,t
)−ε
· Y FH,t
Y FF,t(i) =
(
PF,t(i)
PF,t
)−ε
· Y FF,t
Y HF,t(i) =
(
PEF,t(i)
PEF,t
)−ε
· Y HF,t
where Y jk,t(i), Pj,t(i) and P
E
j,t(i) (j = H or F , and k = H or F ) have similar meanings to
Y jk,t, Pj,t and P
E
j,t except that they are for intermediate goods rather than the semi-ﬁnal
goods.
3.1.3 Intermediate goods ﬁrms and price setting
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Firm i produces a diﬀer-
entiated intermediate good YH,t(i) with the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
YH,t(i) = at · [Kt(i)]1−α [At · Lt(i)]α
where total factor productivity is decomposed into a temporary shock at and a permanent
trend At which is growing at a rate γ1:
ln (At) = ln (At−1) + γ1
The FOCs of the cost minimization problem are given by:

Wt
Ptrt
= α1−α · Kt(i)Lt(i)
mct =
1
at
(1−α)α−1
αα
(
Wt
PtAt
)α
(rt)
1−α (6)
where mct is the real marginal cost.
The ﬁrms need to set prices for both domestically sold and export goods, both denom-
11
inated in the U.S. dollar. In this paper we assume there is no price stickiness and ﬁrms
can freely set prices in any given period5, so the law of one price (LOOP) holds. Since the
market is monopolistic competition, the intermediate goods ﬁrms will set the same prices,
which are a markup over the nominal marginal cost. Therefore, the following holds:
PH,t = P
E
H,t = κ · Pt ·mct (7)
where κ = ε/(ε− 1) is the markup.
3.1.4 Equilibrium and aggregation
The following is the aggregate demand equation of the U.S. economy:
Yt = Ct + It
Real GDP of the U.S. is in fact YH,t, and the following identity holds:
YH,t = Y
H
H,t + Y
F
H,t
According to equation (4) and (5) and their counterparts for the ROW, the above equation
is equivalent to the following:
YH,t =
(
1− ρH) · [PH,t
Pt
]−ω
Yt + ρ
F ·
[
PEH,t · EXt
P ∗t
]−ω
Y ∗t (8)
where P ∗t is the aggregate price level of the ROW, and EXt is the exchange rate of the
ROW currency (named as Ro).
Suppose the money supply rule of the U.S. is:
lnMt+1 = lnMt+1 + εt, lnMt+1 = lnMt + γ2
where Mt is the balanced-growth level of the money supply, γ2 is the balanced growth
rate at the steady state, and εt is a temporary money supply shock. The increase money
supply of the U.S. dollar is distributed as a lump-sum transfer to the U.S. households only
rather than to the world households, so we have:
5Since we will focus on the long-run steady state of the model, it is indiﬀerent to assume price stickiness
or not.
12
Mt+1 −Mt = Tt
3.1.5 The external sector
Nominal net export of the U.S., NNXt, is denominated in the U.S. dollar and deﬁned as:
NNXt = P
E
H,t · Y FH,t − PEF,t · Y HF,t
Combining the above equation with the identities among price indices, we can easily obtain
the following national income identity:
PH,tYH,t = Pt · Yt +NNXt (9)
Since the nominal proﬁt of the economy comes from the monopolistic power of intermediate
goods ﬁrms, then the following identity holds:
Dt = PH,tYH,t − rtPtKt −WtLt
Given the above identities and the binding household's budget constraint, inequality (1),
we can get the following identity linking the net export and oﬀ-shore money demand :
MFt+1 −MFt +NNXt = 0 (10)
This means that if the households of ROW would like to hold more U.S. dollar (MFt+1 −
MFt > 0), the ROW must run a trade surplus (NNXt < 0), which is intuitive.
3.2 The economy of the ROW
Many components of the model economy of the ROW are similar to the U.S. For example,
as the counterpart of equation (8), GDP of the ROW can be expressed as follows:
YF,t = ρ
H ·
(
PEF,t
Pt
)−ω
Yt +
(
1− ρF ) · [PF,t
P ∗t
]−ω
Y ∗t
The intermediate goods market is also monopolistically competitive. Firm i produces
a diﬀerentiated intermediate good YF,t(i) with the following production function:
YF,t(i) = a
∗
t · [K∗t (i)]1−α [A∗t · L∗t (i)]α
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where total factor productivity is decomposed into a temporary shock a∗t and a permanent
trend A∗t , whose growth rate is also γ1. LOOP holds as well and the price setting is given
as:
{
PF,t = κ · P ∗t ·mc∗t
PEF,t = PF,t/EXt
The ROW money supply rule is similarly described by:
lnM∗t+1 = lnM∗t+1 + ε
∗
t , lnM
∗
t+1 = lnM
∗
t + γ2
M∗t+1 −M∗t = T ∗t
where M∗t is the money supply of Ro and T ∗t is the lump-sum transfer from the ROW
central bank to the ROW households. We assume the steady-state money growth rate of
Ro is the same as that of the U.S. dollar, to simplify the model and the analysis.
3.2.1 ROW households' problem and CIA constraint for international trade
Structural diﬀerences between the U.S. and the ROW exist because of the special role
of the U.S. dollar as the world currency. As explained above, there is a CIA constraint
for transactions using the U.S. dollar as the invoicing currency, and the ROW households
need to hold enough U.S. dollars to ﬁnance imports from the U.S. and also its internal
dollar-denominated transactions. Therefore, for the representative ROW household, the
following CIA constraint related to the U.S. dollar holdings must be satisﬁed:
ξD · [(PEH,tY FH,t)+ ϕ · (PF,tY FF,t/EXt)] ≤MFt
where ξD is the strength of the CIA constraint for dollar-denominated transactions outside
the U.S, and ϕ is the fraction of the ROW internal transactions denominated in the U.S.
dollar.
The representative ROW household can also invest in the domestic real capital K∗t with
a capital rental rate r∗t . Then the budget constraint is:
P ∗t C
∗
t + P
∗
t I
∗
t +M
∗
t+1 + EXt ·MFt+1
5 r∗tP ∗t K∗t +W ∗t L∗t +D∗t + T ∗t +M∗t + EXt ·MFt (11)
where variables with asterisk have similar deﬁnitions as their counterparts of the U.S.
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economy.
The ROW internal CIA constraint for its national currency using is then given by:
ξ∗ · (1− ϕ) · PF,tY FF,t ≤M∗t
Because the ﬁnal good Y ∗t (= C∗t +I∗t ) is a CES composite of domestic and foreign semi-ﬁnal
goods, Y FF,t and Y
F
H,t, the above two CIA constraints can be written as:
ξ∗ · (1− ϕ) · PF,t ·
(
1− ρF ) · [PF,t
P ∗t
]−ω
(C∗t + I
∗
t ) ≤M∗t (12)
ξD ·
{
PEH,t · ρF ·
[
PEH,t · EXt
P ∗t
]−ω
+ ϕ · 1
EXt
· PF,t ·
(
1− ρF ) · [PF,t
P ∗t
]−ω}
(C∗t + I
∗
t ) ≤MFt
(13)
Thus the representative ROW household chooses
(
L∗t , C∗t ,K∗t+1,M∗t+1,MFt+1
)
to maxi-
mize his life time utility:
U∗0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt ·
(
lnC∗t − φL ·
(L∗t )
1+η
1 + η
)
subject to the budget constraint (11) and two CIA constraints, (12) and (13). Then FOCs
are given by:
φL · (L∗t )η − λ3tW ∗t = 0
1
C∗t
− λ3t · P ∗t − λ4t · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RFt − λ5t · ξD ·
(
RHt + ϕ · 1EXt ·RFt
)
= 0
λ3t · P ∗t + λ4t · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RFt + λ5t · ξD ·
(
RHt + ϕ · 1EXt ·RFt
)
−β · Et
{
λ3t+1 · P ∗t+1
(
1− δ + r∗t+1
)}
−β · Et
{
λ4t+1 · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RFt+1 · (1− δ)
}
−β · Et
{
λ5t+1 · ξD ·
(
RHt+1 + ϕ · 1EXt+1 ·RFt+1
)
· (1− δ)
}
= 0
λ3t − β · Et
(
λ3t+1 + λ
4
t+1
)
= 0
λ3t · EXt − β · Et
(
λ3t+1 · EXt+1 + λ5t+1
)
= 0
(14)
where λ3t , λ
4
t and λ
5
t are respectively the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to inequality
(11), (12) and (13), and RFt and RHt are deﬁned as follows:
RFt , PF,t ·
(
1− ρF ) · [PF,t
P ∗t
]−ω
RHt , PEH,t · ρF ·
[
PEH,t · EXt
P ∗t
]−ω
It is also easy to prove that λ3t , λ
4
t and λ
5
t are all positive, so inequality (11), (12) and (13)
are all binding.
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3.2.2 Oﬀ-shore dollar
The oﬀ-shore dollar holdings, MFt , evolve as follows:
MFt+1 = M
F
t +NNX
∗
t (15)
where NNX∗t is the nominal net export of the ROW, denominated in the U.S. dollar. The
above identity together with equation (10) can yield the following:
NNXt +NNX
∗
t = 0
which is obviously true in a two-country model.
3.3 Steady state
Since at the long-run steady state, the growth rates of trend technology in both U.S. and
ROW are the same and so are the growth rates of money supply, a balanced growth of the
world economy will be achieved at the steady state: real aggregate variables of the two
economies will grow at the same rate as that of permanent technology growth (which is
γ1), nominal variables (money and nominal wages) will grow at the same rate as that of
permanent money growth (which is γ2), and price levels of the two economies will grow at
the same rate of (γ2 − γ1).
Therefore, after detrending real aggregate variables by At, nominal variables by Mt,
price levels by Mt/At, and Lagrangian multipliers by 1/Mt, we can obtain a stationary
system, and then the steady state can be solved numerically, using the steady-state equi-
librium conditions given in the Appendix.6
6Since this paper focuses on the long-run steady state analysis, it will not discuss whether the global
economic system in the neighborhood of the balanced-growth steady state is saddle-path stable or not.
The saddle-path stability is a holistic phenomenon, depending on the interaction of all agents' behaviors.
In a closed economy, the Taylor principle usually makes the model satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn conditions,
which guarantee the stability and determinacy of the dynamic system. In this paper the simple money
supply rules given by us may possibly result in indeterminacy, and the money supply policy may need to
properly respond to output gap or inﬂation gap to guarantee saddle-path stability. Alternatively, a method
proposed by Farmer and Khramov (2013) can also help to solve the indeterminacy problem. These issues
theoretically will not change our results of steady-state analysis in this paper, and we leave them for our
future studies about cyclical global imbalances.
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3.4 Calibration
Table 1 below gives the calibrated values of the benchmark model parameters. The labor
share α in the production function is set to be a standard value, 0.33. The utility discount
rate β and the capital depreciation rate δ are chosen respectively as 0.96 and 0.10 since our
model is an annual model. The values of η and ω are consistent with the literature such as
Alves et al. (2007). The openness parameter ρH is set to be 0.2 for the U.S., and the price
markup κ is 1.1 as in the literature. Two CIA coeﬃcients, ξ and ξ∗, are both speciﬁed to
be 1, indicating a normal CIA constraint for domestic transactions. ξD is simply set to be
equal to ξ.
Table 1: Parameters of Benchmark Model
Main parameters
parameter α β δ η ω ρH φL κ ξ ξ
∗
value 0.33 0.96 0.10 2.0 1.5 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
Inferred parameters
parameter γ1 γ2 n ρ
F EX m ϕ
value 2.88% 6.18% 0.37 0.074 0.9357 1.430 8.6%
The second panel of Table 1 provides inferred parameters which are calibrated to match
the U.S. and global macroeconomic data. γ1 and γ2 are respectively speciﬁed as the average
growth rates of the U.S. real GDP and the U.S. nominal GDP over the period 1976-2013.
The parameter n indicating the relative eﬀective-labor population of the U.S. to the ROW
is set to be 0.37, in order to match the U.S. GDP share in the world on average over the
period 1976-2013 (which is 28.06%). Thus ρF is calibrated to be n ·ρH , as explained in Liu
(2014b). EX is the steady-state exchange rate of Ro, which is set to be 0.9357 to match
the average USD index over the period 1976-2013. And then the parameter m, which is
deﬁned as the steady-state ratio of the two economies' money supplies (m , M∗t /Mt),
is calibrated to match the value of EX. Finally, we choose the value for ϕ, which is the
fraction of the ROW internal transactions denominated in the U.S. dollar and represents
the strength of the oﬀ-shore dollar demand in some sense. As we will explain later, a
non-negative value for ϕ will always generate a permanent positive trade deﬁcit of the U.S.
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at the steady state, even when it is zero. In this paper, we assume that ϕ can be larger
than zero. This is reasonable because in the reality international transactions take place
not only between the U.S and the ROW (which consists of many separate economies in the
real world) but also within the ROW, and the U.S. dollar is the major invoicing currency
of all these international transactions. For the benchmark model, ϕ is set to be 8.6% so as
to yield a permanent 2.4% trade deﬁcit-GDP ratio of the U.S., which is an average number
over the period 1976-2013.
4 Structural global imbalances
In this section we will discuss the structural global imbalances, represented by a permanent
steady-state trade deﬁcit of the U.S. with the ROW, and analyze its relationship with deep
parameters of the model, such as the parameter ϕ which describes to what extent the rest
of the world demands the U.S. dollar, global long-run technology growth rate, the openness
degree of global economies, and so on.
4.1 Structural global imbalances
Equation (10) indicates that there must be a trade deﬁcit for the U.S. as long as the oﬀ-
shore dollar, MFt , is increasing. Since at the balanced-growth steady state of the world
economy MFt will grow at the rate of γ2, equation (10) can yield the following:
nx = −γ2 · θ (16)
where nx is the net export-GDP ratio of the U.S. at the steady state and θ is the steady-
state ratio of oﬀ-shore dollar to the U.S. nominal GDP. Therefore, as long as γ2 is positive
(i.e. there is a positive long-run growth of global nominal GDP), the world economy will
run into a structural global trade imbalance. Because the ROW has to run a trade surplus
to obtain enough U.S. dollar, in order to ﬁnance the next period international transactions.
The bigger the long-run growth rate of world nominal GDP is and the more the rest of the
world demands oﬀ-shore dollar, the larger the global imbalances will be.
Given equation (16), equation (13), equation (7) and other equilibrium conditions, the
U.S net export-GDP ratio can be expressed more clearly as follows:
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nx = −γ2 · ξD ·
[
1− abs · (1− ρH) · (κ ·mc)−ω + ϕ
n¯
· abs∗ · (1− ρF ) · (κ ·mc∗)−ω
]
(17)
where abs , Yt/YH,t and abs∗ , Y ∗t /YF,t are the steady-state absorption-GDP ratios for
U.S. and ROW, n¯ is the relative size of U.S. nominal GDP to ROW at the steady state
(which is mainly determined by n and is 0.39 for the benchmark setting), and mc and mc∗
are the steady-state real marginal costs for U.S. and ROW. Although abs, abs∗, mc, and
mc∗ are not exogenous and still depend on deep parameters of the model, equation (17)
provides a good way to analyze the relationship between structural global imbalances and
deep parameters.
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Figure 4: Strength of Oﬀ-shore Dollar Demand and Global Imbalances
A key parameter of the model is the fraction of the ROW internal transactions denom-
inated in the U.S. dollar, ϕ, which indicates the strength of the oﬀ-shore dollar demand
from the rest of the world. Structural global imbalances can exist permanently in our
model because of two key issues: one is the CIA constraint of international transactions
using the U.S. dollar as the invoicing currency, and the other is a positive long-run growth
of global nominal GDP. So one can predict that: other things being equal, the larger ϕ is,
the more U.S. dollars the ROW needs to ﬁnance its import from the U.S and its internal
dollar-denominated transactions, so the larger the U.S trade deﬁcit (or global imbalances)
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will be, because running a trade surplus is the only way for the ROW to obtain more U.S.
dollars. Equation 17 together with Figure 4, showing the steady-state relationship between
ϕ and the U.S net export-GDP ratio, proves this story. As explained before, for the bench-
mark calibration ϕ is set to be 8.6%, larger than zero, to reﬂect the heavy use of the U.S.
dollar within the ROW economy as in the reality and then to match the global imbalance
data. When ϕ = 0 , then the U.S. will run a permanent 1.2% trade deﬁcit. When there
is no CIA constraint for international trade, i.e. ξD = 0, long-run global imbalances will
disappear.
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Figure 5: Global Tech Growth, Global Inﬂation and Global Imbalances
As shown in equation 17, another determinant factor for structural global imbalances is
the long-run growth rate of global nominal GDP, γ2. Since at the balanced-growth steady
state export is a ﬁxed proportion of GDP and the fraction of the ROW internal transactions
denominated in the U.S. dollar is also ﬁxed, we have that: the bigger γ2 is, the faster the
ROW GDP and its import grow, and the more extra U.S. dollars the ROW needs to
ﬁnance its next period import and internal dollar-denominated transactions, so the larger
the trade surplus of the ROW and then global trade imbalances will be. Since the long-run
growth rate of global nominal GDP (γ2) is decided by the global long-run technology grow
rate (γ1) and the global long-run inﬂation rate (γ2 − γ1) , structural global imbalances
will be an increasing function of either global long-run technology grow rate or global
long-run inﬂation rate, ceteris paribus. Figure 5 depicts these positive relationships. In
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fact, when γ2 = 0, i.e. there is neither global long-run technology growth nor global long-
run inﬂation rate, structural global imbalances will also disappear. In this circumstance
without nominal growth, the nominal volume of international trade will keep unchanged
at the steady state, and the ROW demand for the U.S. dollar will not increase, and thus
the ROW does not need to run a structural trade surplus, although the oﬀ-shore dollar
holdings of the ROW is still positive.
After the 2007-2008 global ﬁnancial and economic crises, the economic growth slowed
down worldwide, and also many large economies encountered deﬂation pressure. If we take
the viewpoint that the potential economic growth and potential inﬂation rate of the world
economy have a structural decline, we can judge that the global imbalances will shrink
structurally rather than cyclically.
Figure 5 conﬁrms the long-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar as the world currency.
Because the long-run growth rate of global nominal GDP is in fact equal to the long-run
growth rate of U.S. money supply in our model, a change to the long-run growth rate of
U.S. money supply (accompanied by the same change to long-run growth rate of ROW
money supply) will alter the world production, international trade and then structural
global imbalances. So in our model money does aﬀect the real economy even in the long
run.
Figure 6 shows the relationships between structural global imbalances and some other
deep parameters, including ρH representing the openness of international trade, ω which
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and n which is the
relative size of the U.S. economy to the ROW. ρH has a signiﬁcant impact on the structural
global imbalances. Other things being equal, equation 17 indicates that: when ρH increases
(i.e. the global international trading system becomes more open and more of the aggregate
consumption is from import), the structural global imbalances will be enlarged by the
increasing trade volume between U.S. and ROW but will be reduced by the decreasing trade
volume of ROW internal dollar-denominated transactions, and the net eﬀect on structural
global imbalances is positive given that ϕ is less than 100%. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 6 is
consistent with this result. When the world economy is close to autarky, structural global
imbalances approach to disappearing. Along with the ratio of international trade to the
world GDP becoming larger and larger (due to such as globalization), the oﬀ-shore dollar
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demand will increase and structural global imbalances will expand.
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Figure 6: Openness, Elasticity of Substitution, Relative Size of the U.S. economy and
Global Imbalances
The elasticity of substitution has a positive eﬀect on structural global imbalances, as
shown in the second panel of Figure 6. Although equation 17 tells that a bigger elasticity
of substitution means a larger structural global trade imbalance as long as κ ·mc > 1,7 it
is not straightforward to understand this result. As we will see in Figure 9, the special role
of the U.S. dollar generates not only structural global imbalances, but also an unequal
trading system: the terms of trade for the U.S. is greater than one at the steady state
(i.e. the U.S. export price is higher than the ROW export price and the ROW export
goods are relatively cheaper) even after adjusting the terms of trade to the two economies'
real marginal costs. In fact, it is this kind of unequal relative price that makes the U.S.
import more and the ROW import less than the normal situation with equal terms of
trade, and then makes structural global imbalances. When the elasticity of substitution
becomes larger, this kind of relative price eﬀect will become stronger and then lead to more
severe global imbalances.
The last panel of Figure 6 shows that the relative size of the U.S. economy to the
ROW has a positive eﬀect on structural global imbalances as well. This is not hard to
7As our above analysis about the openness of international trade, here there are also two opposite eﬀects
on structural global trade imbalances: the positive one related to the international trade between U.S. and
ROW, and the negative one related to ROW internal dollar-denominated transactions. Still the net eﬀect
is positive.
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understand. Given the degree of openness and the absolute size of the ROW economy
unchanged, when the U.S. economy becomes larger, its import from the ROW and also
the ROW import from the U.S. will both increase. Therefore, the ROW will need more
U.S. dollars to ﬁnance its import, and then its trade surplus should be larger than before.
Equation 17 tells the same story: because ρF = n · ρH and n¯ ' n, nx will remain nearly
unaﬀected when n increases; but be noted that nx is the U.S. net export-GDP ratio, so
the absolute value of U.S. trade deﬁcit will increase proportionally with the U.S. GDP
size. Consequently, the exchange rate of U.S. dollar will appreciate due to the increasing
dollar demand in the global market. Figure 7 shows this positive relationship between the
USD index and the relative size of the U.S. economy in the long run. If we view some
co-movements of the USD index and the U.S. GDP share in the world in Figure 3 as a
long run transition rather than a business cycle ﬂuctuation, our model here provides a
reasonable explanation for these co-movements.
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Figure 7: Relative Size of the U.S. economy and USD Index
4.2 Welfare result
Permanent global imbalances intuitively constitute a permanent gift to the U.S. households
and seem to increase the welfare of U.S. households. The larger the structural global
imbalances are, the more the welfare of U.S. households is likely to be improved. This is
true in our model. Given the long-run growth rate of technology keeps constant, we deﬁne
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the welfares of the U.S. and ROW households using their corresponding detrended period
utility as follows:
WelfareUS , n ·
[
ln
(
C
n
)
− φL · (L/n)
1+η
1 + η
]
WelfareROW , lnC∗ − φL · (L
∗)1+η
1 + η
WelfareWorld ,WelfareUS +WelfareROW
where variables without time subscript denote detrended steady state values as given in the
Appendix, and the world welfare is calculated as the sum of the U.S. and ROW welfares,
according to the utilitarian standard.
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Figure 8: Strength of Oﬀ-shore Dollar Demand and Global Welfares
We focus on the welfare changes when there is a change to the parameter ϕ, which
represents the strength of the oﬀ-shore dollar demand and thus the importance of the U.S.
dollar in the international trade. Figure 8 depicts the relationship between the welfares
of U.S., ROW and the whole world and the parameter ϕ. When the strength of oﬀ-
shore dollar demand increases, the welfare of U.S. households increases, the welfare of
ROW households decreases, and the welfare of the whole world decreases as the net eﬀect.
Figure 4 tells us that when the strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand increases, the structural
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global imbalances will be enlarged, which means that ROW needs to increase its net
export to obtain enough U.S. dollars to ﬁnance its dollar-denominated internal and external
transactions. Intuitively, since its aggregate absorption (consumption plus investment)
as a fraction of its GDP becomes smaller, ROW's welfare will naturally decrease. On
the contrary, U.S. welfare will naturally increase because structural global imbalances
constitute a permanent gift to the U.S. households (they permanently consume more than
what they produce at the steady state) and this kind of gift becomes bigger when the
strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand increases.
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Figure 9: Strength of Oﬀ-shore Dollar Demand and Terms of Trade
The above welfare result can also be explained by the unequal international trade
accompanying the structural global imbalances. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 9 shows how
the terms of trade for the U.S. (deﬁned as U.S. export price over its import price) evolves
with the strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand. The second panel of Figure 8 gives the
result for adjusted terms of trade, which adjust U.S. export price and import price by
U.S. real marginal cost and ROW real marginal cost respectively; and it is consistent with
the result of the ﬁrst panel. Overall, the terms of trade is always beneﬁcial to the U.S.
(export price is relatively higher than import price), even when the parameter ϕ is equally
to zero. As explained before, when ϕ = 0 , structural global imbalances still exists because
the international trade between U.S. and ROW is denominated in the U.S. dollar and the
CIA constraint, equation 13, still must be satisﬁed for the ROW households. To obtain
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enough U.S. dollars, ROW needs to export more, and consequently the ROW goods become
relatively cheaper in the international market, which results in the terms of trade being
beneﬁcial to the U.S. but unfavorable for ROW. Along with the increase of the strength of
oﬀ-shore dollar demand, this kind of unequal trade will become more and more unequal,
and thus the welfare distribution between the U.S. and ROW will become more and more
unequal as well. Weakening the role of the U.S. dollar in the international trade is not a
Pareto improvement, but is a Kaldor improvement for the whole world.
5 Concluding remarks
The data indicates that the long-lasting U.S. trade deﬁcit during the past four decades is
a long-run and structural phenomenon. This paper has proposed a simple framework to
investigate the role of the U.S. dollar as the world currency in accounting for structural
global imbalances in the long-run steady state. The framework highlights the special role
of the U.S. dollar in the international trade. By building a two-country cash-in-advance
growth model with a dollar standard in the international trade, this paper proves that
permanent global imbalances can be sustainable.
Structural global imbalances can exist permanently in our framework because of two
key issues: one is the CIA constraint of international transactions using the U.S. dollar
as the invoicing currency, and the other is a positive long-run growth of global nominal
GDP. Along with the nominal growth of the global economy, the rest of the world needs
more and more U.S. dollars to ﬁnance dollar-denominated transactions, which will lead to
a permanent trade surplus for the ROW and also prevent the U.S. dollar from a substantial
depreciation in the long tun. The permanent U.S. trade deﬁcit is an increasing function of
the strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand. If there is no dollar standard in the international
trade, structural global imbalances will disappear.
The benchmark model is calibrated to match the world economic data of the period
1976-2013, and the framework of this paper is ﬂexible enough to examine the relationship
between structural global imbalances and other deep parameters. It is found that: the
permanent U.S. trade deﬁcit is an increasing function of the long-run growth rate of global
nominal GDP, the openness of the international trade, the elasticity of substitution be-
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tween domestic and foreign goods, and the relative size of the U.S. economy to the rest
of the world. Along with a relatively bigger size of the U.S. economy, the U.S. dollar will
appreciate.
The long-run non-neutrality of the U.S. dollar as the world currency exists. A change
to the long-run growth rate of U.S. money supply (accompanied by the same change to
long-run growth rate of ROW money supply) will inﬂuence the world real production,
international trade and then structural global imbalances.
This paper also shows that: structural global imbalances co-exist with an unequal
international trade, and the terms of trade are beneﬁcial to the U.S.. The welfare analysis
indicates: a weakened U.S. dollar in the international trade, represented by a weaker
strength of oﬀ-shore dollar demand, will reduce the welfare of the U.S. households, but
increase the welfare of the rest of the world; and the welfare of the whole world will be
improved.
Our framework can be extended in several ways. First of all, the role of the U.S. dollar
as a global reserve currency is also believed to be very important to account for long-
run global imbalances. In general, any kind of increasing demand for the U.S. dollar can
generate structural global imbalances. In global ﬁnancial markets, dollar assets including
currency, U.S. government bonds and U.S. equities have advantages in both liquidity and
security. Excessive demands for the U.S. dollar as global reserve currency may result in
not only cyclical but also structural global imbalances. Secondly, this paper focuses on
the long-run steady state analysis of the global economy, but the business-cycle movement
of the U.S. and world economy is equally important. Based on the benchmark model
of this paper, a two-country New Keynesian DSGE model with both long-run economic
growth and short-run price stickiness and other frictions can be constructed, in which global
imbalances can be divided into structural and cyclical ones, and cyclical global imbalances
can be explained by various monetary and real shocks.
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Appendix: detrended steady-state equilibrium conditions
Variables without time subscript in the following equations denote detrended steady state
values for the corresponding variables.
The U.S. economy
M ≡ 1
M∗ ≡ m
PH = κ · P ·mc
ξ · (PC + P · I) = MH

φL · Lη · 1n1+η = λ1W(
λ1 + ξ · λ2)PC = 1
(1 + γ1)
(
λ1 + ξ · λ2) = β · [λ1 (1− δ + r)]
+ξ · β · [λ2 (1− δ)]
λ1(1 + γ2) = β ·
(
λ1 + λ2
)
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M = MH +MF
(1 + γ1)K = (1− δ)K + I
Y HH =
(
1− ρH) · [PH
P
]−ω
Yt
Y HF = ρ
H ·
[
PF
EX · P
]−ω
Y
P =
[(
1− ρH) · (PH)1−ω + ρH · (PF /EX)1−ω] 11−ω
YH = [K]
1−α [L]α
{
W
Pr =
α
1−α · KL
mc = (1−α)
α−1
αα
(
W
P
)α
(r)1−α
Y = C + I
YH = Y
H
H + Y
F
H
γ2M
F + (PHYH − P · Y ) = 0
The ROW economy
PF = κ · P ∗ ·mc∗
YF = Y
H
F + Y
F
F
Y FF =
(
1− ρF ) · [PF
P ∗
]−ω
Y ∗
Y FH = ρ
F ·
[
PH · EX
P ∗
]−ω
Y ∗
P ∗ =
[(
1− ρF ) · (PF )1−ω + ρF · (PH · EX)1−ω] 11−ω
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ξD · [(PHY FH )+ ϕ · (PFY FF /EX)] = MF
I∗ = (1 + γ1)K∗ − (1− δ) ·K∗
ξ∗ · (1− ϕ) · PFY FF = M∗
Y ∗ = C∗ + I∗

φL · (L∗)η = λ3W ∗
λ3 · P ∗C∗ + λ4 · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RF · C∗ + λ5 · ξD · (RH + ϕ · 1EX ·RF ) · C∗ = 1
(1 + γ1)λ
3 · P ∗ + (1 + γ1)λ4 · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RF + (1 + γ1)λ5 · ξD ·
(
RH + ϕ · 1EX ·RF
)
= β · {λ3 · P ∗ (1− δ + r∗)}
+β · {λ4 · (1− ϕ) · ξ∗ ·RF · (1− δ)}
+β · {λ5 · ξD · (RH + ϕ · 1EX ·RF ) · (1− δ)}
λ3(1 + γ2) = β ·
(
λ3 + λ4
)
λ3t · EX · (1 + γ2) = β ·
(
λ3 · EX + λ5)
RF , PF · (1− ρF ) · [PF
P ∗
]−ω
RH , PH · ρF ·
[
PF
P ∗
]−ω
YF = [K
∗]1−α [L∗]α

W ∗
P ∗r∗ =
α
1−α · K
∗
L∗
mc∗ = (1−α)
α−1
αα
(
W ∗
P ∗
)α
(r∗)1−α
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